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RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 45 Fall 1992 NUMBER 1
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS NOT
TO COMPETE BETWEEN PHYSICIANS:
PROTECTING DOCTORS' INTERESTS AT
PATIENTS' EXPENSE
Paula Berg'
It is the signature of our age that no-one, without exception,
can now determine his own life within even a moderately
comprehensible framework, as was possible earlier in the
assessment of market relationships. In principle everyone,
however powerful, is an object.
THEODOR ADORNO, MINIMA MORALIA 37 (1974)
I. INTRODUCTION
Dr. Sandra Foote, an oncologist, terminated her employment
with a Delaware medical group in 1984.' At the time, Dr.
Foote was administering chemotherapy to a number of cancer
patients at Milford Hospital, where she was the only board-
certified staff oncologist.2 Dr. Foote's employment contract
* Visiting Asst. Professor, City University of New York Law School
at Queens College; J.D. Rutgers University School of Law-Newark (1982);
B.A. Hampshire College (1977). Thanks to Gina Novendstern, Esq. for
alerting me to the need for this article; Sid Harring, David Nadvorney
and Kandis Scott for their thoughtful suggestions on prior drafts; and
Deirdre Hammer for her help with research.
1. Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, 1987 WL 8665, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. March- 24, 1987).
2. Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No. 84C-JL-22, 1989 WL
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contained a covenant not to compete which prohibited her from
practicing medicine within a 30 mile radius of Milford or
Dover, Delaware for three years after her termination.' Since
Milford Hospital was within the restricted area, the
noncompete clause required that Dr. Foote immediately stop
treating her hospitalized cancer patients, even though neither
her former employer nor the hospital had another oncologist to
take over treatment.
In 1991, a suburban New York City medical group
terminated the employment of Dr. Joel Novendstern, an
obstetrician and gynecologist.' A noncompetition clause in Dr.
Novendstern's employment contract barred him from practicing
medicine in northern Westchester County for three years.!
This provision forced Dr. Novendstern's patients to choose
between having him deliver their babies at a hospital which
was inconveniently located outside the restricted area,7 or
giving birth at a well-equipped, nearby hospital under the care
of a less familiar doctor.8
Covenants not to compete' are common in physicians'
40965, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. March 23, 1989).
3. Dickinson Medical Group, 1987 WL 8665 at *1
4. Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208, at
*1 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1984). Perhaps in response to the dispute between
Dr. Foote and the Dickinson Medical Group, the Delaware legislature
enacted a statute that specifically bans covenants not to compete between
physicians. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (1983). See also infra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text. This statute invalidated the
noncompetition agreement between Dr. Foote and her former employer.
Consequently, she was able to continue treating her cancer patients.
5. Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, No. 2537/91 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. July 15, 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 576 N.Y.S.2d 329 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, Mo. No. 427, slip
op. (N.Y. June 4, 1992).
6. Id.
7. The covenant stated that an employee whose employment was
terminated could not practice within the medical group's service area,
which was the northern portion of Westchester County, New York. The
only hospital within the restricted area did not extend full privileges to
doctors who did not practice within its service area. Id., slip op. at 4.
8. Dr. Novendstern established a new practice outside of the
restricted area with both former and new patients. Under the terms of
the restrictive covenant, he is prohibited from admitting any of these
patients to the hospital within the restricted area. Interview with Dr.
Joel Novendstern (Oct. 18, 1991).
9. The terms "covenants not to compete," "noncompetition
agreements," and "restrictive covenants" are used interchangeably in this
[Vol.45:1
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employment contracts and partnership agreements."
Typically, these provisions bar a departing physician, whose
employment or partnership relationship is terminated, from
practicing medicine within a certain geographic region for a
specified period of time. In most cases, the restriction
explicitly" or implicitly" bars the physician from treating
patients at hospitals located within the covenant area. 3
Departing physicians are thus unable to treat patients
article to refer to provisions ancillary to employment contracts and
partnership agreements whereby the covenantor agrees, upon the
termination of employment or withdrawal from a partnership, not to
practice medicine within a specified geographic area for a specified period
of time. Noncompetition agreements incident to contracts for the sale of
medical practices are beyond the scope of this article.
10. This article does not distinguish between restrictive covenants in
physicians' employment contracts and in partnership agreements because
both involve the primary focus of this critique, i.e., depriving patients of
convenient access to the doctor of their choice. See infra notes 146-48
and accompanying text. This distinction, however, has an important legal
significance. For example, a number of state statutes bar restrictive
covenants only in employment contracts. See infra note 61.
11. See, e.g., Ballesteros v. Johnson, 812 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991) (covenant not to compete ancillary to employment contract
specified seven hospitals at which the departing cardiologist could not
practice within one year of terminating his employment).
12. Covenants not to compete between physicians typically state that
the covenantor may not practice medicine or surgery within the restricted
area. Such a broadly worded provision bars the practice of medicine in
any capacity within the restricted area, even at hospitals located within
the provision's geographic boundaries. For a more detailed discussion of
the impact of noncompetition agreements on physicians' right to practice
at hospitals, see infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
13. Physicians may not admit patients to a hospital or treat
inpatients until they have been accepted as a member of the hospital's
staff. The application process involves a review of medidal school
performance and clinical qualifications. Additionally, a. hospital may deny
admitting privileges to physicians if it has an exclusive contract with a
medical group to provide practitioners of certain specialties, such as
radiology, cardiac surgery or emergency room medicine. Courts have
generally upheld hospitals' exclusive contracts for medical services in the
face of challenges grounded in constitutional, statutory and common-law
theories. See Andrew K. Dolan & Richard S. Ralston, Hospital Admitting
Privileges and the Sherman Act, 19 -ous. L. REV. 707, 732 (1981);
Lawrence W. Kessenick & John E. Peer, Physicians' Access to the
Hospital: An Overview, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 70 (1979). See also Clark
C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on
Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1108 (1984); Sheree
Lynn McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending and
Granting Staff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (1980).
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requiring hospitalization until they are granted admitting
privileges at a hospital outside of the covenant area.
The purpose of noncompetition agreements among
physicians is to protect an economic interest of the covenantee
by temporarily restricting a departing physician's right to
establish a competitive medical practice. These provisions,
which usually encompass the covenantee's service area, force
departing physicians to relocate so that they can neither
compete directly for new patients nor retain patients treated
while associated with former employers or partners. The
underlying assumption is that most of a departing physician's
patients will choose to be treated by the employer or by the
departing physician's replacement rather than to follow the
physician to an inconvenient location outside the covenant
area.
Courts do not analyze noncompetition agreements between
physicians any differently than comparable provisions between
commercial parties. If the underlying employment contract or
partnership agreement is supported by consideration,"' courts
apply the "rule of reason." Under this rule, noncompetition
provisions are deemed reasonable and enforceable if they are
14. See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.E.2d 626, 630
(Minn. 1983) (declining to enforce covenant not to compete ancillary to
employment contract which was executed after neurosurgeon began
working for clinic, because covenant lacked consideration). See also Kari
Family Clinic of Chiropractic v. Bohnen, 349 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984). The requirement of consideration is not particularly problematic in
the .context of noncompetition clauses ancillary to partnership agreements,
because all partners are equally benefitted and burdened by the provision
and the parties' bargaining power is presumed to be equal. See, e.g.,
Bradford v. Billingson, 299 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Glover v.
Shirley, 155 S.W. 878 (Ky. 1913). However, analysis of the adequacy of
consideration is considerably more complex in cases involving covenants
not to compete ancillary to employment contracts, because only the
employee is burdened and inequality often exists in bargaining power
between the parties. The issue of adequate consideration is most difficult
when a noncompetition clause is ancillary to an at-will employment
agreement, because an employer may unilaterally terminate an employee
after a period of weeks, while the employee may be required to forego
employment in a certain area for a period of years. This difficulty also
exists when employment agreements are signed after employment has
commenced. For excellent discussions of this issue, see Jordan Liebman &
Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post.Employment Noncompetition
Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The
"Afterthought" Agreement, 60 So. CAL. L. REV. 1468 (1987); Kathryn J.
Yates, Consideration For Employee Noncompetition Covenants In
Employments At Will, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123 (1986).
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no broader than necessary to protect a legitimate interest of
the employer and are not unduly burdensome to the employee
or harmful to the public." To remedy a breach of a restrictive
covenant, courts usually grant an injunction barring the
departing doctor from practicing medicine in the covenant area
for a specific period of time.16
Neither courts 7 nor commentators 8  have carefully
considered the practical and jurisprudential ramifications of
enforcing private contractual agreements that involuntarily
terminate existing relationships between doctors and patients
and restrict patients' choice of physicians. This article will
examine current statutory and judicial treatment of covenants
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979). Most courts
apply the factors articulated in the Restatement's formulation of the"reasonableness test," albeit with varying degrees of precision. See infra
text accompanying notes 65-136.
16. See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical Assoc.j 320 S.E.2d 170
(Ga. 1984); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978); Fields Found.,
Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
17. Many cases involving physicians' noncompetition agreements
ancillary to employment contracts and partnership agreements exist. See
Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual
Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to
Employment Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 1014 (1975); Ferdinand S. Tinio,
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on
Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Partnership
Agreement, 62 A.L.R. 3d 970 (1975).
18. Only one law review article specifically addresses noncompetition
agreements between physicians. See Edwin Merrick Dodd, Contracts Not
to Practice Medicine, 23 B.U. L. REV. 305 (1943). Professor Dodd notes
that noncompetition agreements ancillary to physicians' employment
contracts and partnership agreements are usually enforced, but he
declines comment. Id. at 318. Restrictive covenants among physicians
have been the subject of a number of articles targeted at doctors. See
Richard P. Bergen, More Restrictive Covenants, 220 JAMA 1533 (1972);
Angela Roddy Holder, Restrictive Covenants Since 1967, 213 JAMA 1543
(1970); Richard P. Bergen, Practical Considerations on Restrictive
Covenants, 203 JAMA 197 (1968); Veronica M. O'Hern, Public Policy on
Restrictive Covenants, 202 JAMA 185 (1967); Veronica M. O'Hern,
Covenants Restricting Medical Practice, 202 JAMA 210 (1967).
Several excellent general law review articles on the subject of
covenants not to compete also exist. The seminal piece is Harlan M.
Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1960). See also Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Non-
Servitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not
to Compete -A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531 (1984); Steve
D. Shadowen & Kenneth Voytek, Economic and Critical Analyses of the
Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 GEO. L.J. 1425 (1984).
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not to compete between physicians. It will examine the factors
that courts consider, as well as those they do not consider,
when determining whether noncompetition agreements
between physicians are reasonable and enforceable. This
article argues that application of the rule of reason to
restrictive covenants between physicians is theoretically
unsound and practically detrimental. Noncompetition
agreements between physicians, like noncompetition
agreements between attorneys," should be per se invalid.20
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
BETWEEN PHYSICIANS
A. The Position of the American Medical Association
For the past 60 years, the American Medical Association
(AMA) 2  has consistently taken the position that
noncompetition agreements between physicians impact
negatively on patient care. In June 1933, the AMA's House of
Delegates" approved a Judicial Council" resolution which
19. Noncompetition agreements between attorneys are typically held
per se unenforceable because they interfere with the lawyer-client
relationship and restrict clients' choice of an attorney. See infra text
accompanying notes 159-76.
20. Dissenting judges in several cases involving physicians'
noncompetition agreements have taken this position. See, e.g., Shankman
v. Coastal Psychiatric Assoc., 368 S.E.2d 753 (Ga. 1988) (Smith, J.,
dissenting); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting); Ladd v. Hikes, 639 P.2d 1307 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (Buttler,
J., dissenting). See also Gomez v. Chua Medical Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (Sullivan, J., concurring).
21. The American Medical Association (AMA), which comprises
physicians, osteopaths and medical students, is the largest medical and
professional association in the world. Membership in the AMA is not a
prerequisite to obtaining a medical license, board certification or hospital
staff privileges. As of 1982, approximately 50 percent of all licensed
physicians in the U.S. were members of the AMA. Most AMA members
are in private practice. For a detailed description of the internal
structure of the AMA, see In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701,
709-12 (1979).
22. The AMA is composed of state associations that elect
representatives to the House of Delegates, the organization's primary
governing body. The House of Delegates is authorized to amend the
AMA's Constitution, Bylaws and Principles of Medical Ethics. Id. at 710-
11.
23. Eight AMA committees, referred to as "Councils," are responsible
for making policy recommendations to the entire body regarding specific
subjects. The Judicial Council is responsible for interpreting and
[Vol.45:1
1992] PHYSICIANS' COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 7
declared that contractual provisions that interfered with
reasonable competition among physicians or prevented the
"free choice of a physician" were unethical.24 This resolution
was the first AMA proclamation on contractual arrangements
affecting competition among physicians or covenants not to
compete." The 1933 resolution remained unchanged for
nearly 30 years.
In 1960, however, the AMA's Judicial Council published an
opinion that retreated from the 1933 resolution." Rather than
focusing on the impact that covenants not to compete have on
patients, the revision was primarily concerned with the
limitations such agreements impose on physicians' employment
mobility. The 1960 opinion stated that there is no ethical
proscription against a "reasonable agreement not to practice
within a certain area for a certain time, if it is knowingly made
and understood."27 The opinion, however, cautioned that it
was still debatable whether such agreements are "advisable as
being in the best interest of the public.""
In 1971, at a meeting of the AMA's House of Delegates, the
Indiana delegation introduced a resolution that unequivocally
declared that restrictive covenants were unethical." The full
body rejected the measure and instead formally adopted a
substitute resolution that echoed the ambivalent position of
the 1960 opinion.0 The House of Delegates called for the
Judicial Council to review the issue "in light of current legal,
ethical, socio-economic and professional developments within
the practice of medicine."3'
One year later, the Judicial Council reported its findings,
and it recommended banning restrictive covenants in all but
exceptional circumstances.2 The Council explained that it
recommending changes to the AMA's Constitution, Bylaws and Principles
of Medical Ethics. Id.
24. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIGEST OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS,
1846-1958, at 123 (1959).
25. Letter from Betty Jane Anderson, Special Counsel to AMA (Oct.
1, 1991).
26. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 25 (1960).
27. Id.
28. -Id.
29. Anderson Letter, supra note 25, at 2.
30. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 108 (Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1971).
31. IcL
32. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF
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recognizes social and professional conditions have changed
over the years. While there may once have been some need
for restrictive covenants in agreements between physicians,
the Council believes that existing socio-economic conditions
leave little or no justification for restrictive covenant
arrangements. In the opinion of the Council, the use of
restrictive covenants in an agreement between or among
physicians should be entered into only under the most
unusual circumstances and then only after those
circumstances have been found by the local medical society to
require the adoption of such a provision in order to protect
the public and the profession in the particular situation.3
The full body of the AMA, however, once again rejected an
outright ban on restrictive covenants, and the matter was
referred to the Judicial Council for further study."
In 1977, the Judicial Council published a new version of its
Opinions and Reports. 5 The revision was prompted by a 1975
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) complaint charging that
certain of the AMA's ethical prohibitions violated Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act."6 While these Reports
revised a number of ethical provisions, the provision on
restrictive covenants remained unchanged from the 1960
Judicial Council's Opinions and Reports. 7
DELEGATES, REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, REPORT OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL 124 (June 18-22, 1972). In
formulating its recommendation, the Council considered, inter alia, the
comments of attorneys representing medical societies, the American
Association of Medical Clinics, and the Medical Group Management
Association. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 276.
35. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1977).
36. The complaint, which was filed by the FTC against the AMA,
the Connecticut State Medical Society and the New Haven County
Medical Association, in essence alleged that these organizations violated
the Act by restraining doctors from advertising, soliciting .patients, and
entering into contractual arrangements with non-physicians. The
complaint is described in detail in the FTC's decision. See In re
American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified and enforced,
American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1980), affid, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). See also Anderson Letter, supra note
25, at 2.
37. Compare AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 25 (1960) with AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 4.63
[Vol.45:l
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Finally, in 1980, the AMA House of Delegates adopted an
opinion of the Judicial Council that declared that
noncompetition agreements were not "in the public interest."38
While this amendment, which is currently in effect, clearly
states that restrictive covenants between physicians are
contrary to the public interest," it does not deem such
agreements unethical. The Council was reluctant to adopt an
outright ban on restrictive covenants ° because of the Federal
Trade Commission's final order in In re American Medical
Ass'n." This order, while not specifically pertaining to
covenants not to compete, compelled the AMA to cease and
desist from declaring certain contractual practices among
physicians to be unethical. 2 The Council believed that a
declaration that noncompetition agreements were unethical
might run afoul of the FTC decision. 3 Ironically, an FTC
order, which was intended to increase competition among
physicians, has perhaps forever prevented the passage of an
ethical proscription against anticompetition agreements."
(1977).
38. Anderson Letter, supra note 25, at 2.
39. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 9.02 (1989).
Several other sections of the American Medical Association's
CURRENT OPINIONS also disfavor noncompetition agreements between
physicians. See, e.g., id. at § 6.11 (encouraging competition between
doctors for ethical reasons, and to foster higher quality service); see also
id. at § 9.06 (describing freedom to choose physicians as a right of every
individual).
40. See Anderson Letter, supra note 25, at 2.
41. In re American Medical Ass'n, 99 F.T.C. 440 (1982).
42. Id. The FTC's final order required the AMA to cease and desist
from restricting member doctors from: (1) advertising or publishing the
price of medical services; (2) soliciting patients through advertising; (3)
entering into contractual arrangements for medical services; (4) entering
into contractual arrangements with entities that offer medical services to
the public; and (5) entering into contractual arrangements with non-
physicians affiliated with entities that provide medical services to the
public. Id. at 441-42.
43. See Anderson Letter, supra note 25, at 2.
44. Within the AMA, national organizations representing group
practices are among the opponents of a declaration that restrictive
covenants are unethical. See Letter from Betty Jane Anderson, Special
Counsel to AMA (Jan. 3, 1992).
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B. Federal and State Statutes
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "[eivery
contract, combination.., or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations ......, The plain language of the Sherman Act seems
to apply to covenants not to compete ancillary to both
employment contracts and partnership agreements."6 While a
relatively small number of cases involving covenants not to
compete between employers or partners have been brought
under the Sherman Act, none of these cases involved
physicians.'7 No other federal antitrust law has been used to
'45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
46. See Blake, supra note 18, at 628 n.8; Harvey J. Goldschmid,
Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive
Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (1973);
Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust
Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 LAW FORUM 621,
626 (1977).
Professor Sullivan correctly notes that the common law "rule of
reason" for post-employment restraints overvalues the individual interests
of the employer and employee, while failing to sufficiently consider the
agreement's broader anticompetitive effects. He persuasively argues for
application of federal antitrust principles, which would entail a more
precise analysis of the restraint's impact upon the relevant market,
because they would better assess the reasonableness of anticompetition
agreements. Id. at 643.
47. See Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 751 n.380
(1982). Federal antitrust laws clearly apply to the medical profession. See
Arizona County Medical Soc'y v. Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1982).
It is unclear, however, whether the health care industry possesses the
necessary conditions for an efficient free market, given the prevalence of
third party payors and the inability of many patients, especially those
suffering from emergency conditions, to rationally select among competing
health care options. Moreover, there is considerable disagreement about
the role and desirability of promoting competition among health care
providers. For a variety of perspectives, see Timothy Stoltfus Jost, The
Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health
Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525 (1988) (government regulation essential to
maintain and promote quality health care); Arnold S. Relman, M.D.,
Practicing Medicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1150 (1987) (greater physician self-restraint, not increased competition,
needed to curb rising health care costs and preserve integrity of the
medical profession); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST,' DEREGULATING THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY 81-82, 200-01, 354-56 (1982) (increasing' competition
among health care providers would increase quality of health care);
James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in
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challenge the legality of noncompetition agreements between
physicians. 8
Eight states, however, have invalidated noncompetition
agreements between physicians either through direct
legislation or judicial interpretation of state antitrust statutes.
Colorado and Delaware are the only states that have enacted
statutes specifically invalidating covenants not to compete
between physicians."
In 1982, Colorado amended its antitrust statute, which
prohibited covenants not to compete in many types of
employment contracts, to include a limitation on
noncompetition agreements between physicians. Essentially,
the Colorado statute maintains the legitimacy of non-compete
provisions between physicians by permitting the recovery of
monetary damages from a covenantor/doctor who causes the
employment agreement to terminate by breaching the non-
compete provision." This statute was adopted because the
state legislature believed that restrictive covenants between
physicians adversely affected patient care and the delivery of
health care services.5'
In 1983, Delaware adopted a statute that declared that
covenants not to compete ancillary to employment,
partnership, or corporate agreements, which restrict the right
of a physician to practice medicine in a certain location for a
Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?,
34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981) (increased competition among health care
providers would decrease overall costs, increase the information
physicians convey to patients, and reduce unnecessary procedures).
48. Sullivan, supra note 46, at 623-24.
49. See infra notes 50 & 52. For a listing of the states that have
invalidated noncompetition agreements through judicial interpretation of
state antitrust statutes, see infra notes 55-60.
50. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3) (West 1982).
51. See COLO. REP. HUME & COLO. SEN. SOASH, MEMORANDUM RE
HOUSE BILL 1174, COLO. HOUSE OF REP. (1982). This memorandum
stated that restrictive covenants between physicians are not in the public
interest because they, inter alia, (1) are anti-competitive and inhibit free
enterprise; (2) restrain trade and enable some medical organizations to
engage in monopolistic practices, which increase the cost of medical care;
(3) protect the business interests of the medical organization, while not
protecting the health care needs of patients; (4) have -a negative impact
on patient care; and (5) sever the doctor-patient relationship. By not
authorizing injunctive relief to remedy the breach of a restrictive
covenant between physicians, this statute promotes continuity in the
doctor-patient relationship.
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certain period of time, are void.52 Like the Colorado measure,
the Delaware law permits an action to recover damages related
to termination of the underlying agreement, including damages
associated with competition. 3
There is no written legislative history that reveals the intent
of the Delaware statute. Evidence suggests, however, that the
measure was passed in response to complaints to state
legislators from a hospital that was threatened by the loss of
its only staff oncologist because of a covenant not to
compete. 4
The state antitrust statutes of Alabama,55 California,6
Florida,57 Louisiana,"' Montana59  and North Dakota °
expressly prohibit contractual restraints upon the practice of a"profession," and they have been held to render invalid all
noncompetition agreements ancillary to employment
contracts"' between physicians.62
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (1983).
53. Id.
54. Interview with Bernard Brady, Legislative Aide to Delaware
State Senator Thurman Adams (July 24, 1991). According to Mr. Brady,
the bill, which was sponsored by Senator Adams, was drafted at the
urging of representatives of Milford Hospital, located in southern
Delaware. At the time, the hospital was involved in a dispute between
Dr. Sandra Foote and her employer, the Dickinson Medical Group, over a
covenant not to compete in the employment contract, culminating in four
judicial opinions. See Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, 1989 WL 100466
(Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 1989); Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No.
84C-JL-22, 1989 WL 40965 (Del. Super. Ct. March 23, 1989); Dickinson
Medical Group v. Foote, 1987 WL 8665 (Del. Super. Ct. March 24, 1987);
Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No. 834-K, 1984 WL 8208 (Del. Ch.
May 10, 1984).
55. ALA. CODE § 8-1-1(a) (1975).
56. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33(1) (West 1988).
58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A) (West 1985).
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1992).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987).
61. All of the state antitrust statutes that prohibit contractual
restraints upon the practice of a profession expressly permit such a
restraint if it is ancillary to an agreement dissolving a partnership. See
ALA. CODE § 8-1- 1(c) (1984); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33(3) (West 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:921(D) (Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-705 (1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-08-06(2) (1987).
62. See, e.g., Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805 (Ala. 1968) (covenant
not to compete between physicians violated Alabama statute prohibiting
contracts that restrain the practice of a profession); Bosley Medical Group
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The state antitrust statutes of twenty-eight states"3 and the
District of Columbia" do not expressly apply to professions,
and instead only prohibit contractual restraints affecting
business, trade and commerce.' The enforceability of
v. Abramson, 207 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1984) (noncompetition
agreement between plastic surgeon and medical corporation was void and
unenforceable under California statute prohibiting contracts that restrain
a person from engaging in a lawful profession); Bergh v. Stephens, 175
So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (provision in employment contract
barring plaintiff from practicing medicine for a period of five years was
void and unenforceable under Florida statute prohibiting contracts
restraining the free exercise of a lawful profession); Gauthier v. Magee,
141 So. 2d 837 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (provision of doctor's employment
contract requiring the payment of $60,000 if he practiced medicine'in the
area within five years was illegal and unenforceable under Louisiana
statute prohibiting all covenants not to compete incident to employment
contracts); Western Montana Clinic v. Jacobson, 544 P.2d 807 (Mont.
1976) (court declared covenant not to compete incident to orthopedic
surgeon's employment contract unenforceable because it violated Montana
statute prohibiting contracts restraining the exercise of a lawful
profession); Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc. v. St. Joseph's Hospital and
Health Center, 479 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1992) (covenant not to compete in
employment contract between corporation, which supplied emergency
physicians' services to hospitals, and its physician employees violated
antitrust statute and was void).
63. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.562, 45.50.574 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44.1402 (1956 & Supp. 1991-92); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-302
(Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-27 (West 1987); GA. CODE
ANN. § 13-8-2 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c) (1992); IDAHO CODE §
48-101 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-1-1 (West 1987); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 553.4 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-112 (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 93, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.51 (West 1981);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.031 (Vernon
1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-801 (1988); N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:9-3 (Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-1 (Michie 1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
340 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1331.06 (Anderson 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West
1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 53-9-8 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (1988); VA. CODE
ANN. §'591-9.5 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1986.030 (West
1989); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.03 (West
1989).
64. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4502 (1991).
65. See Bayly, Martin & Fay v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1989)
(court held that antitrust statute, which declared that every contract
restraining the lawful exercise of a profession, trade, or business was
void, did not require application of per se rule and instead prohibits only
unreasonable restrictions). See also People v. Roth, 420 N.E.2d 929, 930
(N.Y. 1981) (holding that state antitrust statute, which expressly applied
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noncompetition agreements between physicians in these
jurisdictions is governed solely by the rule of reason. A number
of states have, in fact, recently amended their state antitrust
statutes to codify application of the common law rule of reason
to -covenants not to compete ancillary to all types of
employment contracts.&
C. Common Law: The Rule of Reason
Under the common law, covenants not to compete ancillary
to employment contracts and partnership agreements have
traditionally been regarded as agreements in restraint of trade
that contravene public policy favoring free competition. 7 Yet,
courts have recognized that noncompetition agreements are
enforceable to prevent a departing employee from competing
with a former employer if the employee has acquired an unfair
competitive advantage over the employer as a consequence of
the employment or partnership association.' Noncompetition
agreements are never justified to prevent fair competition by
former employees. If they do nothing more than prevent fair
competition, they are unreasonable contracts in restraint of
free trade.69
only to "business," "trade," or "commerce" did not apply to physicians
because they are professionals).
66. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.774 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (1989); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-11 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25- 01
(1988); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (West 1987); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 103.465 (West 1988).
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1) & (2)
(1981) (promises that limit competition or restrict promisor's exercise of
gainful occupation are restraints of trade).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188, cmt. (b) (1981);
see also Blake, supra note 18, at 646-51.
69. See Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986)
("t]he law will not enforce a contract merely to prohibit ordinary
competition"); Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear, Nose and Throat, Assoc., 751
S.W.2d 289, 290-291 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("The covenant was solely to
protect Appellee from competition . . . . 'In the absence of special
circumstances, a covenant which has as its sole purpose the elimination
of competition is not reasonable.'" (quoting Hospital Consultants, Inc. v.
Potyka, 531 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)). Some courts,
however, exhibit a profound misunderstanding of the theoretical
distinction between justified and unjustified noncompetition agreements.
See, e.g., Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 417 P.2d 450, 453 (N.M. 1966). In
Lovelace, the covenantor/physician argued that a noncompetition
agreemefit was unenforceable because it was not reasonably related to
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Courts developed the rule of reason in order to strike a
balance between the opposing objectives of promoting free
economic competition and protecting employers from unfair
competition and upholding the freedom of contract. ' In most
jurisdictions, a covenant not to compete is reasonable and
enforceable if the level of restraint it imposes is neither greater
than is required for the protection of a legitimate interest of
the employer nor unduly hard on the employee or public."
1. Does the Covenantee Have a Protectible Interest?
Courts recognize that a medical employer has a legitimate
interest warranting protection by a noncompetition agreement
if a departing physician was provided with (a) patient contacts,
(b) training or (c) confidential business information.
(a). Patient Contacts
In commercial cases, an employer's interest in retaining
present customers may justify enforcement of a covenant not to
compete.' Thus, if employees have had substantial personal
contact with clientele, courts usually enforce restrictive cove-
nants to prevent these customers from severing their relation-
ship with employers and becoming customers of departing
employees. 3
the interests of the clinic, it was intended to restrict competition, and it
was aimed.at forcing employees to remain in the employ of the employer.
The court responded by holding that "[tihese are usually the main
purposes of such covenants, and these are legitimate purposes, so long as
the restrictions are reasonable." Id. See also Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco
Medical Group, 576 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (App. Div. 1991) ("Established in
1947, the medical group developed and prospered as a result of the
considerable time, money and efforts of its members. By including
restrictive covenants in the employment contracts, the members were
validly protecting their interest in their investments from competition.").
See also Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Mo. 1973).
70. Blake, supra note 18, at 650-51.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1979). The
geographical scope and duration of the restrictive covenant must also be
reasonable. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 445, 449 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990) (customers are property of the employer and may be protected
by a covenant not to compete); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v.
Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 706 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1952) (covenant
not to compete drafted to prevent customers from following departing
employee is enforceable. if there was significant personal relationship
between employee and customers). See also Blake, supra note 18, at 657.
73. In cases in which employees' exposure to customers was "great,"
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In the health care context, patients who have received ongo-
ing treatment from a departing physician often wish to contin-
ue the relationship after the physician separates from an em-
ployer or partnership. 4 Indeed, the most commonly asserted"protectible interest" in cases involving restrictive covenants
between physicians is the need to prevent patients from follow-
ing a departing physician."
Mandeville v. Harman" was one of the first decisions to
consider in detail whether covenantees/physicians could legiti-
mately use noncompetition agreements to preserve their pa-
tient base. Dr. Mandeville, a physician with a well established
practice in Newark, New Jersey, hired Dr. Harman to assist
him with his large caseload. Their employment contract con-
tained a covenant not to compete which provided that, upon
the termination of Dr. Harman's employment, he could never
practice medicine or surgery within Newark. After working for
Dr. Mandeville for about one year, Dr. Harman violated the
covenant by establishing a private practice in Newark."
After acknowledging that a covenant not to compete is a
disfavored restraint on free trade, the court stated that such
an agreement is enforceable only if it "afford[s] a fair protec-
one study found that the enforcement rate. of covenants not to compete
was 83%. Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition
Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 505 (1990).
74. The risk to an employer of losing customers to a departing em-
ployee is a function of the closeness and duration of the employee's rela-
tionship with customers. This risk is greatest when an employee works
closely with customers over a long period of time, especially if the
employee's services are key to the transaction. See Blake, supra note 18,
at 661.
Employers of physicians face a significant likelihood of losing pa-
tients to departing employee/physicians because the physician-patient
relationship is uniquely intimate and often lasts for a considerable period
of time. See, e.g., Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1164 (N.J. 1978)
(60 patients followed departing dermatologist); Budoff v. Jenkins, 532
N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (App. Div. 1988) (over 200 patients followed departing
physician who specialized in treating women).
75. See, e.g., Retina Services, Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 653
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449 N.E.2d
276, 279 (Ind. 1983); Middlesex Neurological Assoc. v. Cohen, 324 N.E.2d
911, 915 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175,
177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1166; Gant v. Hygeia
Facilities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 842, 844-45 (W. Va. 1989); Pollack v.
Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
76. 7 A. 37 (N.J. Ch. 1886).
77. Id. at 38.
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tion to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given,
and [is] not so large as to interfere with the interest of the
public."' 8 Dr. Mandeville argued that the covenant was needed
to protect the goodwill of his medical practice, which he had
built up over a considerable period of years. 9
The court, however, did not recognize that Dr. Mandeville's
goodwill was something that could be appropriated, fairly or
unfairly, by Dr. Harman. Instead, the court noted that the
peculiarly personal nature of Dr. Mandeville's relationship
with his patients was not transferable to another. As such, Dr.
Mandeville's relationship with patients was not an asset ac-
quired by Dr. Harman during his prior employment which
thereby entitled him to enforce a covenant not to compete. The
court concluded that protection of a medical practice's patient
base was not a sufficient interest to warrant judicial enforce-
ment of a covenant not to compete.80
The Mandeville approach, however, has not been widely
followed. Rather, the dominant analytical model treats an
employer/physician's relationship with patients as an asset
that can be unfairly appropriated by the employee/physician,
thus warranting protection by a covenant not to compete.
Granger v. Craven" was an early case articulating the ap-
proach currently followed by a majority of state courts. Dr.
Granger, who had a general medical practice in Rochester,
Minnesota for 30 years, hired Dr. Craven to run the otolaryn-
gology branch of his practice. The parties' employment con-
tract, which was mutually terminable at will, provided that Dr.
Craven could not practice medicine or surgery within a 20-mile
radius of Rochester for a period of three years after the termi-
nation of his employment.82 After about two years, Dr. Craven
severed the employment relationship and established a general
medical practice in Rochester. While Dr. Craven did not active-
ly solicit former patients, he placed an advertisement in a local
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id. at 38.
80. Id. at 40-41. Mandeville may also reflect the view that if depart-
ing physicians' patients choose to follow them, they must have had no
significant relationship with the employer/physician. Thus, the departing
physician could not have appropriated an asset of the employer which
justifies imposition of a restrictive covenant. See Blake, supra note 18, at
656.
81. 199 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1924).
82. Id. at 11.
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newspaper announcing his intention to practice in the area.8"
Unlike the court in Mandeville, the Granger court viewed a
covenantee/doctor's relationship with patients as an asset that
was susceptible to unfair appropriation by an employee. The
court reasoned that, because of the unique nature of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, the only reasonable protection for a
professional about to employ another on such terms as to give
the employee access to the acquaintance and confidence of his
clients is to require the employee to enter into a covenant not
to compete with the employer for a reasonable time after the
relationship is terminated.84
The Granger court held that the covenant was reasonable
because it did no more than was necessary to protect Dr.
Granger's "hold" upon his patients and to prevent them from
continuing treatment with Dr. Craven. It stated, "[c]ertainly a
competent surgeon, particularly a specialist, may be presumed
to acquire as firm a hold upon patients as the driver of a laun-
dry wagon upon customers."85
Many state courts follow Granger in viewing patients as an
asset belonging to a medical employer or partnership.86 From
this premise, it follows that covenants not to compete are a
logical and justified means of preventing the unjust enrich-
ment of departing physicians who, in the absence of a
noncompetition agreement, could deplete their former
employers' patient base. Thus, courts typically enforce re-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 13.
86. See, e.g., Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 653 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449 N.E.2d 276,
279 (Ind. 1983); Middlesex Neurological Assoc. v. Cohen, 324 N.E.2d 911,
915 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 177
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1166 (N.J.
1978); Home v. Radiological Health Servs., 371 N.Y.S.2d 948, 962 (Sup.
Ct. 1975), afftd, 379 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div. 1976); Gant v. Hyge'ia Facil-
ities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 842, 844 (W. Va. 1989); Pollack v. Calima,
458 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Following this approach, in Daniel Boone Clinic v. Dahhan, '734
S.W.2d 488 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987), the court held that an employment con-
tract between a departing physician and a clinic did not vest patients
with any third party beneficiary rights which entitled them to notice of
their physician's termination. The departing physician's employment con-
tract included a restrictive covenant barring him from practicing within
50 miles of the employer for 18 months. Instead, the court recognized the
existence of a contractual relationship between the clinic and the pa-
tients.
87. Unjust enrichment analysis seems to underlie most decisions
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strictive covenants to prevent patients from following depart-
ing physicians and thereby reducing covenantees' patient bas-
es. 88
(b). Training
Courts traditionally enforce restrictive covenants if employ-
ers have provided training to employees."' The rationale is
enforcing noncompetition agreements to protect the employer's patient
base. This was articulated in Granger v. Craven, 199 N.W. 10, 12 (Minn.
1924):
What one creates by his own labor is his. Public policy does not,
intend that another than the producer shall reap the fruits of
labor. Rather it gives to him who labors the right by every legit-
imate means to protect the fruits of his labor and secure the
enjoyment of them to himself.
See also Reddy v. Community Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d
906, 916 (W. Va. 1982) ("The situations most likely to give rise to such
an injury are those where the employer stands to lose his investment in
employee training, have his trade secrets or customer lists converted by
the employee, or have his market share threatened by the employee's
risk-free entry into the employer's market.").
88. See, e.g., Retina Servs., 538 N.E.2d at 655; Raymundo, 449
N.E.2d at 279; Middlesex Neurological Assoc., 324 N.E.2d at 915;
Saliterman, 361 N.W.2d at 179; Granger, 199 N.W. at 12-13; Karlin, 390
A.2d at 1166; Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 575
(N.Y. 1977); Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, P.C., No. 2537/91,
slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 15, 1991), affd, 576 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div.
1991); Gant, 384 S.E.2d at 846; Pollack, 458 N.W.2d at 599.
89. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 10 J. OF LEGIS. STUD. 93 (1981). This' article em-
ploys a useful framework for assessing if a post-employment restriction is
a justified method for an employer to recapture an investment in employ-
ee training. Under this scheme,, "general training" is defined as training
that is useful in many firms, not only the firm that provides it. When
an employer provides an employee with general training, the employee's
overall value in the labor market is increased. "Specific training" consists
of instruction in the employer's peculiar customs and practices and only
increases an employee's productivity in the firm that provides it. It does
not increase the employee's value to other employers. Id. at 93. Accord-
ingly, Rubin & Shedd argue that restrictive covenants are a valid means
for employers to recapture investment in general training. Furthermore,
judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants intended to recapture an
investment in general training is macroeconomically sound, because-it
will encourage employers to provide general training to employees and
thus increase the work force's skills and knowledge. Id. at 97. On the
other hand, employers who provide specific training to employees do not
increase the employees' value in the labor market and should not be
entitled to judicial enforcement of a noncompetition agreement. Id. at 96.
In Reddy, 298 S.E.2d at 913, the court expressly adopted this
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that restrictive covenants permit employers, who have invested
in employee training and thereby increased employees' value in
the labor market, to recapture their investment by temporarily
restricting the employees' ability to use that training competi-
tively after the employment relationship has been terminat-ed.' °
In general, courts have held that employer/physicians who
provide training have a protectible interest warranting enforce-
ment of a restrictive covenant.9 For example, in Isuani v.
Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group,92 the court enforced a re-
strictive covenant after finding that a radiology group had paid
for a departing physician's training in certain subspecialties,
including magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and
diskograms."
A number of courts have denied enforcement of a restrictive
covenant if the employer/physician did not pay for additional
employee training but instead merely provided the new physi-
cian/employee with the opportunity to gain experience.94 New
framework in a case involving physicians. In resolving disputes about
restrictive covenants between physicians, the application of Rubin &
Shedd's model is still troubling. While it enables physician/employers to
recover their investment in general training, it nevertheless achieves this
at the expense of patients.
90. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 89, at 97.
91. See, e.g., Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ark. Ct. App.
1986) ("the courts have found an interest sufficient to warrant enforce-
ment of the covenant only in those cases where the covenantee provided
special training, or made available trade secrets, confidential business
information or customer lists . . . ."); Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear, Nose and
Throat Assoc., 751 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("There are two
competing interests in a covenant not to compete. The first, of course is
the protection of the investment made by employers in their employees,
such as training."); Reddy, 298 S.E.2d at 913 ("Economic analysis compels
the conclusion that restrictive covenants should be upheld where the
employee has undergone certain types of training. Restrictive covenant
protection is necessary, for example, to encourage efficient and extensive
investment in 'human capital'.") (citations omitted).
92. 798 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 802
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1991).
93. Id. at 347-48.
94. See, e.g., Darrow v. Kolczun, No. 900A004759, 1991 WL 35120 at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1991) (finding that the covenantor had ac-
quired his skills through his education, not as a result of his association
with orthopedic surgery group); Lewis v. Surgery & Gynecology, Inc., No.
90AP-300, 1991 WL 35010 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991) (denying
enforcement of restrictive covenant after finding that although the depart-
ing physician had completed his medical education immediately prior to
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physicians, who had completed internships and residencies"5
at considerable personal expense," were deemed fully trained
when they arrived at their employers' doorsteps. 7
No court, however, has analyzed whether a post employment
restriction is the least restrictive means for a physi-
cian/employer to recapture an investment in special training.
This investment could be readily recaptured by a contractual
provision requiring repayment of training expenses by the
employee if the employment relationship is prematurely termi-
accepting employment by covenantee and became more skilled during the
course of his employment, he was fully trained when he assumed the
position); Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1981) (noting that experience and skill gained by departing
physician during his employment does not justify a post-employment re-
striction). But see Freudenthal v. Espey, 102 P. 280, 284 (Colo. 1909) ("It
was certainly of great benefit to defendant, an inexperienced professional
man, to be associated with a capable and efficient member of his own
profession, long experienced, and enjoying an extensive practice."); Wilson
v. Gamble, 177 So. 363 (Miss. 1937) (upholding validity of restrictive
covenant between physicians, noting that covenantees were just beginning
to practice, while the covenantors had been in practice for many years);
Foltz v. Struxness, 215 P.2d 133, 135 (Kan. 1950) (upholding restrictive
covenant and noting that covenantee was 69-years old and had many
years of experience, while covenantor had only practiced for one year).
95. Experiential learning has been central to medical education in
the U.S. since the late nineteenth century. See generally KENNETH M.
LUDMERER, LEARNING TO HEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL EDUCATION (1985). Certification to practice all medical specialties
requires clinical internships and residencies. Most students spend the last
two years of medical school as clinical interns. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES, 1992-93 MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS
4 (1991). Thereafter, certification to practice various medical specialties
requires graduate study which ranges from three to seven years in dura-
tion. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1990-91 DIRECTORY OF GRADUATE
MEDICAL EDUCATION (1990).
96. In 1990, the average cost of one year of medical school was
$18,786 at a private institution and $14,932 at a public institution.
AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, 1992-93 MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION RE-
QUIREMENTS 50 (1991). The average indebtedness of a medical school
graduate in 1990 was $45,991. Id. at 49.
97. A more equitable approach is to deny enforcement of a restrictive
covenant if the employer has only provided an opportunity for a new
physician to gain experience. Given the extensive length of medical train-
ing, doctors are fully trained when they assume their first post-residency
position. While it is certainly true that new doctors benefit from practic-
ing with seasoned physicians, creating a rich learning environment for
new physician/employees does not entail any economic expenditure by the
employer and, therefore, should not justify the imposition of a post-em-
ployment restraint.
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nated. This provision would fully compensate the employer for
the training without impacting on the health care choices of
the departing physician's existing or future patients.
(c). Confidential Business Information
Another ground for enforcing covenants not to compete is to
protect employers from the competitive use of confidential
information or trade secrets acquired by employees during the
course of employment.98 The rationale is that employers have
a legitimate interest in preventing employees from sharing
confidential plans, processes or data with competitors, and it
has proven quite a persuasive argument for commercial em-
ployers seeking enforcement of noncompetition agreements.99
This ground is sometimes asserted in cases involving
noncompetition agreements between physicians. In some cases,
departing physicians, who plan to continue treating patients
acquired during the course of employment, leave with a list of
patients' names and addresses. °° Additionally, some physi-
cians, whose practice is dependent upon referrals from other
physicians or hospitals, may leave with a list of referral sourc-
es, or at least knowledge of the identity of these sources. In
such cases, employers argue that these lists constitute confi-
dential business information which must be protected against
competitive use by means of covenants not to compete.
Few courts, however, appear to have granted or denied en-
forcement based solely on this reason.' One of several fac-
98. Blake, supra note 18, at 667-74. An employee's misappropriation
of trade secrets also may give rise to a statutory or common law cause
of action. These claims occasionally are asserted against physicians. See,
e.g., Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, No. 834-k, 1984 WL 8208, at *2-
*3 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1984), affd, No. 84C-JL-22, 1991 WL 40965 (Del.
Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1989) (departing physician's acquisition of patient list
constituted violation of state law prohibiting misappropriation of
employer's trade secrets); Prentice Medical Corp. v. Todd, 495 N.E.2d
1044, 1051 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (enjoining departing nurse from soliciting
patients of gynecological clinic after finding that she had tortiously ac-
quired confidential information).
99. See, e.g., Scott v. Gen. Iron & Welding Co., 368 A.2d 111, 116
(Conn. 1976); Harwell Enters. v. Heim, 173 S.E.2d 316, 320 (N.C. 1970);
Donahoe v; Tatum, 134 So. 2d 442, 444 (Miss. 1961). See also Whitmore,
supra note 73, at 507-08.
100. See, e.g., Dickinson Medical Group, at *1 (while employed by
medical group, departing oncologist took original computer print-out of
patients' names and addresses).
101. See, e.g., Dental East, P.C. v. Westercamp, 423 N.W.2d 553, 555
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tors underlying a decision to enforce a covenant not to compete
is whether a departing physician acquired a patient or referral
list while employed by the covenantee."°
2. Is the Covenant Broader Than Necessary to Protect
Covenantee's Interest?
If a physician/covenantee is deemed to have an interest
warranting protection, the court then decides whether the
restrictive covenant extends beyond the bounds necessary to
protect that interest.
(a). Nature of Covenantee's Medical Practice
Some courts have been careful to insure that a
noncompetition agreement only prohibits the departing physi-
cian from practicing a medical specialty that is also practiced
by the covenantee. Courts engaging in this type of analysis will
enforce a covenant not to compete only to the extent that it
bars a departing physician from practicing a specialty that
directly competes with a former associate.' 3
In Ellis v. McDaniel,'°4 a medical corporation sought en-
forcement of a covenant not to compete ancillary to an employ-
ment contract with Dr. Ellis, an orthopedic surgeon. The cove-
(Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (court enforced covenant not to compete because
departing dentist had access to employer's methods of operation and busi-
ness techniques, as well as its patients' names).
102. See, e.g., Total Health Physicians v. Barrientos, 502 N.E.2d 1240,
1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("It is conceded that plaintiff furnished defen-
dants with patient lists, referrals, confidential advertising and marketing
techniques, office space, clinical facilities and supplies."); Middlesex Neu-
rological Assoc. v. Cohen, 324 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (in
determining whether restrictive covenant was reasonable, court considered
that departing physician had acquired contacts with "the medical commu-
nity from which a neurologist must derive patients by 'referral"); Fields
Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)
(court enforced restrictive covenant, noting that defendant copied
employer's list of referral sources prior to terminating employment);
Geocaris v. Surgical Consultants, Ltd., 302 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981) (by providing referral contacts, and by aiding development of his
reputation among area physicians, a protectible right to reasonably pre-
vent competition was acquired by covenantee).
103. See, e.g., Fumo v. Medical Group of Michigan City, Inc., 590
N.E.2d 1103, 1109 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d
1161, 1169 (N.J. 1978); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 326 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (N.Y.
1971); Geocaris, 302 N.W.2d at 78.
104. 596 P.2d 222 (Nev. 1979).
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nant provided that, upon the termination of his employment,
Dr. Ellis would not "practice medicine" for two years within
five miles of the town of Elko."° After the employment con-
tract expired, Dr. Ellis notified the clinic that he intended to
establish an orthopedic surgery practice in Elko. The clinic
immediately sought an injunction, which was granted by the
trial court."°
The Nevada Supreme Court carefully examined whether the
clinic was justified in barring Dr. Ellis from practicing orthope-
dic surgery, even though no doctor on the clinic's staff prac-
ticed this specialty. The court concluded that this restraint was
overly broad and upheld the lower court's ruling only to the
extent that it prohibited Dr. Ellis from practicing areas of
medicine that were actually practiced by doctors employed by
the clinic. '0
The court in Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group"°8
further refined this approach. It held that a medical corpora-
tion that specialized in radiology could not restrain a departing
radiologist from performing certain specific radiological proce-
dures that were not offered by the corporation."
When a court determines that a covenant piohibits a depart-
ing physician from practicing specialties that are not directly
competitive with the covenantee, the court will often limit the
remedy to any overlapping areas of practice and will not en-
tirely enforce the covenant."' Departing physicians are thus
permitted to practice medicine within the covenant area as
long as the departing physician's specialty is not offered by for-
mer associates.
(b). Duration of Covenant
The duration of a restrictive covenant should be no longer
than is necessary for employers to hire replacements and for
replacements to have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
105. Id. at 223.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 224.
108. 798 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
109. Id. at 352. Specifically, the court 'permitted the departing physi-
cian to continue performing "B" readings of X-rays, interventional radiolo-
gy, arthrograms, angiography, angioplasty, diskograms, facet blocks and
magnetic resonance imaging. Id.
110. See, e.g., Field Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d at 133
(preventing doctor from performing abortions but allowing him to practice
obstetrics and gynecology).
[Vol.45:1
1992] PHYSICIANS' COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 25
their effectiveness to customers. "1 This is especially so if the
purpose behind a restrictive covenant is to protect the
covenantee's patient relationships. Among physicians, the
duration of a restrictive covenant is reasonable to the extent
that it provides physician/employers with a reasonable period
of time to hire new doctors and gives those doctors sufficient
time to demonstrate their competence to patients.'
Courts often, however, do not engage in any fact-finding or
theoretical analysis on the issue of whether the duration of a
restrictive covenant between physicians is reasonable. Instead,
most courts simply hold that covenants not to compete between
physicians that last between two and five years are reas'on-
able.' Courts are not inclined, however, to enforce restrictive
111. See, e.g., Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (noting that two-year restraints are generally found to be reason-
able because they allow enough time to "obliterate in the minds of
the . . . customers the identification" of the physician with the previous
employer). In general, a covenant longer than the period needed for an
employer to hire a replacement and to permit that replacement to prove
her competency to customers would not serve its purpose of preventing
unfair competition. If, after several years, a replacement cannot retain
the departed employee's customers, then the customers clearly patronized
the employer's establishment because of the former employee's personal
qualities, not because of some quality of the employer. See Blake, supra
note 18, at 677-78 (arguing that reasonable time restrictions depend on
the nature of the customer relationship).
112. Some variation among courts exists as to where the duration
inquiry fits into the overall reasonableness analysis. For example, some
courts evaluate the reasonableness of the covenant's duration as part of
an analysis of whether the covenant is no greater than is' necessary to
protect the covenantee. See, e.g., Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1971). For other courts, this inquiry is separate. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy,
417 P.2d 450 (N.M. 1966). Courts that fail to consider the nature of the
employer's interest or the burden on the employee and public, but in-
stead focus only on the reasonableness of the covenant's geographic scope
and duration, are at the least precise end of the spectrum. These courts
risk enforcing restrictive covenants that are normative in form but sub-
stantively unjustified. See, e.g., Vascular and Surgical Assocs., Ltd. v.
Loiterman, 599 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Rash v. Toccoa Clinic
Medical Assocs., 320 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. 1984); Thomson, 377 S.W.2d at 465.
A more comprehensive approach is to assess the reasonableness of a
restrictive covenant's duration as part of an inquiry into whether the
provision is broader than necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the
covenantee. Such an approach effectuates the purpose of imposing a time
restriction, i.e., to give employers (or employee replacements) an opportu-
nity to prove their competence to departing employees' customers.
113. See, e.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 871
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covenants between physicians that are unlimited in dura-
tion."
(c). Scope of Geographic Restriction ' 5
The geographic scope of a restrictive covenant that is de-
signed to protect customer relations is reasonable if it encom-
passes the area from which the employer attracts custom-
ers."' Therefore, courts typically enforce restrictive covenants
between physicians if they correspond to the covenant-
ee/physician's service area."7 One court, for instance, has
ruled that a geographic restriction is reasonable if it encom-
passes the area in which the covenantee markets its medical
services to the public."'
(d). Restrictions on Practicing at Hospitals
Noncompetition agreements between physicians often broad-
ly state that covenantors may not "practice medicine or sur-
(1977) (upholding five-year restriction without analyzing reasonableness);
Gant v. Hygeia Facilities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 842, 845 (W. Va. Ct.
App. 1989) (three-year restrictive covenant ruled reasonable "on its face.")
The average duration of enforced restrictive covenants, including those
between physicians, is 24.5 months. Whitmore, supra note 73, at 515.
114. See, e.g., Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 739 (Ga. 1898) (hold-
ing that restrictive covenant of unlimited duration was unreasonable and
oppressive); Akhter v. Shah, 456 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding
that a noncompetition agreement between medical corporation and cardi-
ologist employee that was unlimited in duration was unenforceable).
115. The average mileage restriction for restrictive covenants that are
enforced is 33.9 miles. Whitmore, supra note 73, at 511.
116. See Blake, supra note 18, at 679-81.
117. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chua Medical 'Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 193
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding enforcement of restrictive covenant that
barred surgeon from practicing within a 30-mile limit of his former
employer's office, because a substantial portion of patient base resided
within the proscribed area); Fumo v. Medical Group of Michigan City,
Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that 25-mile
radius in restrictive covenant was not overbroad considering how far
patients were willing to travel to obtain a particular service); Cogley
Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1962) (ruling a 25-mile
limitation reasonable, considering that the clinic had 30,000 patients
within its service area and attracted some patients from over 100 miles
away); Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 309 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1981) (ruling that a 50-mile restriction, from which 62 percent of
the employer's business originated, was reasonable and is not overbroad).
118. See Pollack v. Calimag, 458 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990).
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gery" within a specified area for a certain period of time. '
Such a provision, which is limited by geography and duration,
rather than function, implicitly bars departing doctors from
practicing medicine at hospitals located within the covenant
area. 120
Cases are split in determining, however, whether a restric-
tive covenant' is overly broad if it prevents departing physi-
cians from practicing at hospitals that have certain equip-
ment. 21
119. See, e.g., Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985); Hoddeson v. Conroe Ear, Nose & Throat Assocs., 751 S.W.2d 289
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363, 364
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Oudenhoven v. Nishioka, 190 N.W.2d 920, 921
(Wis. 1971).
120. No published case has rigorously analyzed. whether restricting a
departing physician's right to practice at hospitals within the covenant
area goes beyond the bounds necessary to protect a covenantee's legiti-
mate interest. On its face, such a restriction seems overly broad, because
departing physicians who have relocated are prevented from treating
.certain patients who had no relationship with the covenantee. These
patients include the departing physician's new patients as well as other
physicians' hospitalized patients on whose cases the departing physician
has consulted. Therefore, a general restriction prohibiting the "practice of
medicine and surgery" within the covenant area unjustifiably burdens the
covenantor's ability to compete with the covenantee. See infra text accom-
panying notes 151-61. For an example of a case that fails to fully ana-
lyze this issue by not identifying the employer interests at stake, see
Fumo, 590 N.E.2d at 1109.
121. See, e.g., Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (enforcing restrictive covenant that barred ophthalmologist
from practicing at eight hospitals in Chicago which possessed equipment
necessary to the practice of his subspecialty). Compare Ellis v. McDaniel,
596 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1979) (denying enforcement of restrictive cove-
nant to the extent that it barred orthopedic surgeon from practicing his
specialty at the only hospital in a large area that was equipped to per-
form major surgical procedures). It is flawed, however, to consider this
question as part of assessing whether the covenant goes beyond the
bounds necessary to safeguard a protectible interest of the cov'enantee.
Rather, the issue of whether a covenant is unreasonable when it prohib-
its a departing physician from practicing at a hospital that has special
equipment should be part of determining either (1) the burden on the
departing physician because she would be deprived of the right to per-
form certain procedures on patients in whom the covenantee has no in-
terest, or (2) the harm to the public because the departed physician's
new patients would be deprived of the right to have certain procedures
performed on them by their physician.
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3. Would Enforcement of the Covenant Unduly Burden the
Covenantor?
After determining that a covenant is broader than necessary
to protect a legitimate interest of the covenantee, courts then
determine if the provision imposes an undue hardship on the
covenantor. Covenantors usually argue that their personal
circumstances make it particularly difficult to move their pro-
fessional activities outside of the covenant area.'22 However,
this argument rarely persuades courts to deny enforcement of
an otherwise reasonable restrictive covenant between commer-
cial parties."2 ' Courts are not particularly sympathetic toward
doctors who assert that a restrictive covenant is unenforceable
because it imposes a unique personal hardship upon them,2 "
unless the hardship is quite severe.125
4. Would Enforcement of the Covenant Harm the Public?
Courts have recognized that restrictive covenants between
physicians are injurious to the public if enforcement of the
covenants will lead to a shortage of health care providers with-
in the covenant areas. 26 For example, in New Castle Orthope-
122. See Blake, supra note 18, at 684-86.
123. But see Whitmore, supra note 73, at 517 (noting a statistical
correlation between the degree of harm to the employee and the likeli-
hood that a restrictive covenant would be enforced).
124. See, e.g., Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, No. 2537/91,
slip. op. (N.Y Sup. Ct. July 15, 1991), affd, 1991 WL 247748 (N.Y. App.
Div. Nov. 18, 1991) (rejecting argument that restrictive covenant between
obstetrician and medical corporation was unduly burdensome because it
required the covenantee/physician to relinquish admitting privileges at
the only hospital at which he maintained full privileges); Gant v. Hygeia
Facilities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d 842, 846 n.7 (W. Va. 1989) (enforcing
restrictive covenant despite argument that it would cause physi-
cian/employee personal hardship to move his family).
125. See, e.g., Lewis v. Surgery & Gynecology, Inc., No. 90AP-300,
1991 WL 35010, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991) (denying enforce-
ment of noncompetition agreement between urological surgeon and profes-
sional corporation in part because surgeon's daughter, who suffered from
a speech impairment, would be unduly harmed by transferring to a
school outside of covenant area); Williams v. Hobbs, 460 N.E.2d 287, 290
(Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (denying enforcement of restrictive covenant in part
because it would bar an osteopath from practicing at one of the few
osteopathic hospitals in the state).
126. See Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805, 810 (Ala. 1968); Fumo v.
Medical Group of Michigan City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1109 (Ind. Ct.
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dic Assoc. v. Burns,2 ' a physicians' association that special-
ized in orthopedic medicine sought enforcement of a restrictive
covenant barring a departing physician from practicing this
specialty within the county for two years.12 8 After finding that
there was a shortage of orthopedic specialists in the county,
the court held that the lower court erred in entering a prelimi-
nary injunction enforcing the covenant, because the public's
interest in having a sufficient number of orthopedic surgeons
outweighed its interest in promoting the freedom of con-
tract.129
Similarly, in Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza,3 °
a North Carolina professional association of gastroenterologists
sought enforcement of a restrictive covenant that barred a
departing physician/employee from practicing for three years
within 20 miles of the clinic's principal place of business, and
within five miles of any hospital or office serviced by the corpo-
ration. 3 ' The departing physician argued that the covenant
was injurious to the public because it would result' in a short-
age of gastroenterologists in the area.'32 In balancing the pub-
lic interest in competition in the health care market against
the public interest in freedom to contract, the court determined
App. 1992); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1170 (N.J. 1978); New
Castle Orthopedic Assoc. v. Burns, 392 A.2d 1383, 1388 (Pa. 1978);
Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 871 (1977); Nalle
Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363, 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991);
Statesville Medical Group v. Dickey, 418 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
Courts that examine the impact of restrictive covenants upon the
physician services market as an aspect of "public harm" employ a rather
crude analytical method. Generally, anticompetitive effects short of a
complete monopoly of the health-care market by the employer are insuffi-
cient to invalidate a covenant not to compete. Professor Sullivan has
persuasively criticized this approach. He argues that courts cannot ade-
quately assess "public harm" without conducting the type of detailed
market analysis that is used in federal antitrust litigation. See Sullivan,
supra note 46, at 647-50.
127. 392 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1978).
128. Id. at 1384.
129. Id. at 1387.
130. 373 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
131. Id. at 450-51.
132. Id. at 453. In support of his claim that the restrictive covenant
was injurious to the public, Dr. Petrozza submitted affidavits from 41
local physicians stating that the loss of the defendant would give the
plaintiff a monopoly on the practice of gastroenterology in the area and
that one practitioner of this specialty was not sufficient to meet the
community's need for these services. Id.
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that the community's need for an adequate number of gastro-
enterologists outweighed the public interest in upholding a
contract freely agreed to by private parties, and it held that
the covenant was unenforceable.'
Not all courts, however, have accepted the argument that
noncompetition agreements between physicians are contrary to
the public interest solely because they may lead to a shortage
of physicians in the covenant area."3' One court rejected this
argument and explained that, while enforcement of the restric-
tive covenant would lead to a shortage of health care providers
in the restricted area, it would result in an increase in health
care providers in the area in which the departing physician
established a new practice.'35 Thus, any harm to the public
within the covenant area would be offset by a benefit to those
who reside within the departing physician's new service ar-
ea.13 6
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE COVE-
NANTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS
When physicians comply with covenants not to compete,
either voluntarily or as a consequence of judicial enforcement,
133. Id. at 455. See also Statesville Medical Group v. Dickey, 418
S.E.2d 256, 259-60 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that covenant not to
compete was unenforceable because it would give covenantee a monopoly
over the practice of endocrinology in its service area and would require
patients who wanted the services of a different endocrinologist to travel
45 minutes).
134. See, e.g., Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973) (enforc-
ing restrictive covenant despite evidence-of shortage of surgeons in north-
west part of state); Gant v. Hygeia Facilities Found., Inc., 384 S.E.2d
842 (W. Va. 1989) (enforcing restrictive covenant which required cove-
nantor to leave rural area despite evidence of statewide shortage of rural
doctors).
135. Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d at 777. The court also upheld
the provision because of "a counterbalancing public policy ... in en-
forcing contractual rights and obligations." Id.
136. Id. This analysis is peculiar on several levels. First, it completely
ignores the hardship to patients who lose their doctor due to a
noncompetition agreement and who will presumably find little comfort in
knowing that patients in some other area can now benefit from their
doctor's services. Second, on a larger scale, this analysis is sound only if
the departing physician relocates to a geographic region which has a
shortage of health care providers. Otherwise, the shortage of health care
providers in the restricted area will not be offset by the lessening of a
shortage of health care providers in the departed physician's new service
area.
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their patients must choose between establishing a relationship
with a new physician or following their doctor outside of the
covenant area. Even if existing patients desire to follow a de-
parting physician to a less convenient location, their health,
age, financial circumstances, or the quality of the hospital
outside the covenant area may preclude this option. Whether it
is sound from the standpoint of public policy and jurisprudence
to enforce private contractual agreements that interfere with
the doctor-patient relationship and restrict patients' choice of
physicians will be examined in this section.
A. The Impact of Restrictive Covenants Between Physicians
on the Quality of Health Care
1. Involuntary Termination of the Physician-Patient
Relationship
The majority approach to noncompetition agreements be-
tween physicians, which weighs the economic interests of the
parties, is contrary to medical research that demonstrates that
continuity in the doctor-patient relationship fosters the deliv-
ery of quality health care and that the involuntary termination
of this relationship may have lasting, negative effects on pa-
tients.3 7
Long-term, continuous relationships between doctors and
patients impact positively on many aspects of health care. '8
Patients who have permanent relationships with primary care
physicians are less likely to seek treatment in hospital emer-
gency rooms than patients who have no such relationship.'39
137. No empirical evidence exists that restrictive covenants are needed
to protect physician/employers' economic interests. Indeed, one medical
commentator has concluded that these provisions are usually not econom-
ically justified. Richard P. Bergen, Practical Considerations on Restrictive
Covenants, 203 JAMA 197, 198 (1968).
138. See Ralph B. Freidin & Alan M. Lazerson, M.D., 'Terminating the
Physician-Patient Relationship in Primary Care, 241 JAMA 819, 822
(1979) ("The physician-patient relationship is central to the process of
primary care.").
139. See, e.g., John H. Wasson, M.D. et al., Continuity of Outpatient
Medical Care in Elderly Men: A Randomized Trial, 252 JAMA 2413,
2416 (1984); William B. Toms, M.D., M.P.H., An Analysis of the Impact
of the Loss of a Primary Care Physician on a Patient Population, 4 J.
FAM. PRACT. 115, 117 (1977) (use of emergency room in semi-urban area
increased after retirement of family physician, who had been in practice
for over 20 years); Joel J. Alpert, M.D. et al., Delivery of Health Care for
Children: Report of an Experiment, 57 PEDIATRICS 917, 920-23 (1976)
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Additionally, the hospital and intensive care stays of patients
who have ongoing relationships with physicians are consider-
ably shorter than the stays of patients who lack a permanent
relationship with a physician.14
A longstanding, trusting relationship between doctor and
patient often improves a physician's diagnostic abilities' and
increases the likelihood that the patient will comply with pre-
scribed therapy.' Providing continuity is particularly impor-
tant to the treatment of certain patients and certain medical
conditions. For example, continuous care is especially vital
when treating children.' Moreover, the development and
maintenance of a strong "therapeutic alliance" between doctor
and patient may be dispositive in determining if psychiatric
treatment succeeds or fails.' 4 Given the centrality of the
(provider continuity in treating inner city families resulted in decreased
hospitalizations, operations, hospital visits, and appointment breaking).
140. See Alpert et al., supra note 139, at 921; Wasson et al., supra
note 139, at 2415-16. Wasson states that "the findings suggest that poli-
cies favoring improved outpatient provider continuity may result in signif-
icant financial savings." Id. at 2416.
141. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, Somatization Disorders: One of
Medicine's Blind Spots, 254 JAMA 3075, 3078 (1985) (creation of long-
term relationship between doctor and patient facilitates ability to recog-
nize psychosomatic symptoms and treat patients accordingly); Jonathan T.
Stewart, M.D., Huntington's Disease, 37 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 105, 112
(1988) (strong bond between physician, patient, and patient's family facili-
tates recognition of symptoms and treatment decisions for this progressive
disease).
142. See, e.g., Arlene F. Frank, Ph.D. & John G. Gunderson, M.D.,
The Role of the Therapeutic Alliance in the Treatment of Schizophrenia,
47 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 228, 232 (1990) (schizophrenic patients who
had strong alliances with their psychiatrists were more likely to comply
with medication regimen); Ramon Boza, M.D. et al., Patient Noncompli-
ance and Overcompliance: Behavior Patterns Underlying a Patient's Fail-
ure to "Follow Doctor's Orders", 81. POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 163, 168
(1987) (good rapport with physician may lead to greater patient compli-
ance with treatment, such as taking medication); Freidin & Lazerson,
supra note 138, at 820 (involuntary termination of the physician-patient
relationship may lead to patients' erratic compliance with prescribed
treatment).
143. See Marshall H. Becker, Ph.D. et al., Continuity of Pediatrician:
New Support for An Old Shibboleth, 84 J. PEDIATRICS 599 (1974) (con-
tinuity in pediatric care yielded higher staff and patient satisfaction,
greater ease in discussing behavioral problems, and better appointment
keeping); see also Alpert et al., supra note 139, at 921.
144.. See Frank & Gunderson, supra note 142, at 235 (patients who
formed strong alliances with their therapists more likely to remain in
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therapist-patient relationship to psychotherapeutic treatment,
it is particularly disturbing that courts uphold noncompetition
agreements that involuntarily terminate this relationship." '
Two studies have examined the impact upon patients of the
involuntary termination of their relationship with a private
primary care physician, and both found that this experience
can be traumatic and long-lived. ' For example, patients who
have suffered the involuntary loss of a physician need a consid-
erable period of time to find a suitable replacement. 4 ' Until a
new primary care physician is found, patients tend to seek
treatment for non-emergency conditions in their local hospital
emergency rooms.' 8 Moreover, the negative impact of invol-
untarily losing a primary care physician does not end once a
replacement is found. Patients need two to five years to feel
therapy, comply with medication -regimen and achieve better outcomes);
Elsa Marzialli, D.S.W. et al., Therapeutic Alliance Scales: Development
and Relationship to Psychotherapy Outcome, 138 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
361, 363 (1981) (patients who developed positive relationships with ther-
apist achieved greatest gains from psychotherapy).
145. See, e.g., Shankman v. Coastal Psychiatric Assoc., 368 S.E.2d 753
(Ga. 1988) (enforcing restrictive covenant between a psychiatrist and
clinic). Cf Metropolitan Medical Group v. Eaton, 546 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989) (affirming lower court's denial of injunctive relief to
medical group seeking enforcement of restrictive covenant against psy-
chologist because of inadequate factual record below, but suggesting that
such a restriction could, depending on the facts, be found reasonable).
146. See Toms, supra note 139, at 115, 117 (in-depth interviews were
conducted with 30 blue-collar families to assess the effects of the retire-
ment of their physician from his 20 year old private family practice);
Keith Sinusas, M.D., Patients' Attitudes Toward the Closing of a Medical
Practice, 28 J. FAM. PRAC. 561 (1989) (physician, who had a private fami-
ly practice in a small town in rural Vermont for eight years, distributed
questionnaires to 200 patients to determine their response to his impend-
ing retirement. to assume a teaching position). While there has been a
great deal of medical research on the impact of continuity in patient
care, all but these two studies have examined this issue within the con-
text of clinics, which are usually staffed by interns and residents, not
private physicians. Since noncompetition agreements between physicians
most often involve physicians in private practice, these two studies are
the best available empirical information on the likely impact upon pa-
tients of losing a private physician due to compliance with a covenant
not to compete.
147. Toms, supra note 139, at 115 (only one out of every six families
was able to establish a reliable and permanent relationship with a new
physician within six months of losing their primary care physician with-
out experiencing "great difficulty").
148. See Wasson et al., supra note 139, at 2416; Toms, supra note
139, at 117.
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confident that their new physician knows their medical prob-
lems well and more than five years to trust that their emotion-
al problems are understood.'4 1
Patients who have received certain types of care are likely to
experience increased hardship from the loss of their doctor. For
example, mothers and their families appear to form a particu-
larly strong bond with their obstetrician-gynecologist and may
be particularly troubled by the loss of this relationship.'50
In sum, medical research on continuity and discontinuity in
provider care has established that the involuntary loss of a
primary care physician is a significant physical and psychologi-
cal '5 hardship and may be experienced by the patient for an
extended period. Public policy, as effectuated through judicial
decisions in cases involving noncompetition agreements be-
tween physicians, should foster provider continuity in health
care, not undermine it.
2. The Impact of Restrictive Covenants on Hospitalized
Patients
As previously noted, the language of most restrictive cove-
nants requires departing physicians to cease the practice of
medicine and surgery at all hospitals located within the re-
stricted area.'52 This aspect of restrictive covenants between
physicians is rarely the subject of judicial consideration, even
though it has far reaching consequences on the quality of
health care and range of choices available to four categories of
patients. First, departing physicians must cease treatment of
their patients who are hospitalized at the time of the termina-
149. Sinusas, supra note 146, at 563. These findings suggest that
those patients who have been under a departing physician's care for the
longest period of time, who are most likely to be older patients, tend to
suffer the greatest hardship from involuntary termination.
150. Id. at 564. But see Stephen P. Flynn, M.D., Continuity of Care
During Pregnancy: The Effect of Provider Continuity on Outcome, 21 J.
FAM. PRAC. 375, 379-80 (1985) (finding that health care provider continu-
ity had no effect on the health status aid patient satisfaction of preg-
nant patients in a university-based practice, but noting that "continuity
may improve this outcome in other settings, such as chronic illness, el-
derly patients, or private practice.").
151. See Peter R. Lichstein, M.D., The Resident Leaves the Patient:
Another Look at the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 762, 762-63 (1982) (noting that patients commonly experience an-
ger, guilt, anxiety, fear and depression after the termination of a rela-
tionship with clinic residents).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
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tion of employment.
Second, departing physicians must cease consulting on the
cases of other physicians' hospitalized patients, and performing
emergency room services.'53 As a result, these patients, in
whom the covenantee has no arguable interest, lose the benefit
of the departing physician's expertise and experience as a
consultant. 54
Third, departing physicians may not admit patients, who
have chosen to follow them outside the restricted area, to hos-
pitals within the covenant area for the duration of the restric-
tive covenant. These patients must, therefore, relinquish the
opportunity to be treated at a hospital that is more likely to be
convenient to their families and friends,' 5 and may be superi-
or to hospitals located outside of the covenant area. 5 '
Finally, restrictive covenants impact on the new patients of
the departed physician who has relocated outside of the cove-
nant area. These patients must relinquish the opportunity to
be treated at hospitals within the restricted area, even if they
offer superior care to hospitals located outside of the covenant
area. 157
In sum, restrictive covenants between physicians limit the
range of hospital care choices available to several distinct
groups of patients, some of whom have no prior relationship
with the covenantee and in whom the covenantee has no argu-
153. See Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Peairs, 790 P.2d 752,
756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (covenant not to compete, which prohibited
orthopedic surgeon from practicing "medicine and surgery," encompassed
performing on-call duties in emergency room in hospital located within
restricted area).
154. This restriction is also overly broad because it affects patients
with whom the employer had no relationship or interest. See supra note
120.
155. For purposes of marketing their services, hospitals are considered
to have a service area extending 15 miles in all directions, because this
is the distance that most doctors and patients are willing to travel. See
Deborah W. Garnick et al., Appropriate Measures of Hospital Market
Areas, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 69, 72 (1987).
156. The quality of care provided by hospitals in neighboring commu-
nities can vary a great deal. See Linda Sunshine & John W. Wright, The
Best Hospitals in America 2 (1987) ("[tlhe kind of treatment received
from hospital to hospital, even in the same geographic area, is sometimes
so dramatically different that choosing a particular hospital can literally
determine your treatment.").
157. This restriction is also overly broad because it affects patients
with whom the employer had no relationship or interest. See supra notes
119-21 and accompanying text.
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able interest. If a departing physician is the only practitioner
of a certain specialty in a small hospital in an isolated area, a
restrictive covenant may have devastating consequences for the
doctor's private in-patients and for the community as a
whole.'58 In the case of a large hospital in a metropolitan
area, a physician's compliance with a noncompetition' agree-
ment results in discontinuity in the treatment of the departing
physician's in-patients and the hospital's loss of an experienced
member of its staff.
B. Jurisprudential Consequences
1. Inconsistency With Treatment of Restrictive Cove-
nants Between Attorneys
Despite the AMA's declaration that restrictive covenants
between physicians are not in the public interest,'5" and de-
spite medical research demonstrating the importance of conti-
nuity in the doctor-patient relationship,"6 courts have been
unwilling to hold these agreements contrary to public policy
and hence per se unenforceable.'"' Yet, courts consistently in-
validate noncompetition agreements between attorneys on the
grounds that they inappropriately intrude upon the lawyer-
client relationship and restrict the public's right to choose an
attorney.'62 The inconsistent judicial treatment of restrictive
158. See, e.g., Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote, 1989 WL 40965 (Del.
Super. Ct. March 23, 1989) (medical group sought enforcement of restric-
tive covenant against only oncologist on staff of small rural hospital).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 21-44.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 138-51.
161. Two courts have concluded that covenants not to compete are not
per se unenforceable after considering the argument.in some detail. See
Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978) and Ohio Urology, Inc. v.
Poll, 594 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). See also infra notes 172-94
and accompanying text. Several other courts have summarily dismissed
the argument that noncompetition agreements between physicians are
against public policy. See Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Peairs,
790 P.2d 752, 758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic
Assn., 449 N.E.2d 276, 280-81 (Ind. 1983).
162. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410-11
(N.Y. 1989) (holding that law firm's partnership agreement, which condi-
tioned payment of withdrawing partner's uncollected revenues on his
refraining from competing with former firm, was void as against' public
policy); In re Silverberg, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480, 480-81 (App. Div. 1980) (pro-
vision of partnership agreement, which amounted to covenant restricting
practice of law, was void as against public policy); Gray v. Martin, 663
P.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (provision of attorneys' partner-
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covenants between these two types of professionals cannot be
justified.'" Indeed, the philosophical and public. policy under-
pinnings of the per se rule apply with greater force to restric-
tive covenants between physicians than to restrictive cove-
nants between attorneys. Simply put, if the reasoning behind
the per se rule for attorneys is valid, the reasoning applies
even more strongly to physicians.
In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted a code of
professional conduct, which included a specific disciplinary rule
addressing restrictive covenants between attorneys.' The
rule stated that a "lawyer shall not be a party to or participate
in a partnership or employment agreement with another law-
yer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the
termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except
as a condition to payment of retirement benefits."'65
Dwyer v. Jung'" was the first case to consider DR 2-108(A)
in the course of analyzing whether to apply a per se or reason-
ableness rule to restrictive covenants between attorneys.167 In
holding that restrictive covenants between attorneys were
contrary to public policy and therefore invalid, the court explic-
itly adopted the view that a defining feature of professionalism
ship agreement, which penalized attorney for entering into competitive
practice, was contrary to public policy and void). But cf. Haight, Brown
& Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845
(Ct. App. 1991) (holding that California rule of professional conduct did
not prohibit withdrawing partner from compensating former partner if he
represented clients previously represented by firm).
163. Some commentators have criticized judicial acceptance of a per se
ban on anticompetition agreements between attorneys. See, e.g., Stephen
E. Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and the Legal Profession, 29 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 423, 45.6-57 (1985) (calling for application of rule of reason,
rather than per se ban, to noncompetition agreements between attorneys
to enable attorneys to protect themselves against unfair competition by
departing partners).
164. For a detailed history of the American Bar Association's treat-
ment of restrictive covenants between attorneys, see id. at 429-34.
165. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A)
(1989).
166. 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aftd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
167. In Dwyer, a partnership agreement included a dissolution provi-
sion that allocated clients among the partners and barred them from
representing each other's clients for five years. After the partnership
dissolved, one of the former partners charged two others with "attempting
to pirate [his] clients and undermining his relationship with certain
named insurance carriers." Id. at 499.
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is an ethical obligation to place the needs and interests of the
client above the needs and interests of the professional. The
court stated:
Commercial standards may not be used to evaluate the rea-
sonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong public
policy considerations preclude their applicability. In that
sense lawyer restrictions are injurious to the public interest.
A client is always entitled to be represented by counsel of his
own choosing .... The attorney-client relationship is con-
sensual, highly fiduciary on the part of counsel, and he may
do nothing which restricts the right of the client to repose
confidence in any counsel of his choice .... No concept of
the practice of law is more deeply rooted. The lawyer's func-
tion is to serve, but serve he must with fidelity, devotion and
erudition in the highest tradition of his noble profession."M
While the Dwyer court relied on the Model Code in reaching
its decision, it was not merely enforcing its requirements."9
Rather, the court looked to the Code as one of several sources
of public policy.'7 ° From these sources, the Dwyer court, along
with most courts which have considered the issue, concluded
168. Id. at 500. In Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d
142 (N.J. 1992), the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the issue of the
enforceability of covenants not to compete between attorneys. In holding
that the provision violated public policy, the court reaffirmed the theoreti-
cal justification for applying a per se rule, stating that "Dwyer makes
clear that the practice of law must be carefully governed by ethical con-
siderations rather than by economic concerns that guide strictly commer-
cial enterprises." 607 A.2d at 147.
169. The Dwyer court's view disfavoring noncompetition agreements
between attorneys was also revealed by their criticism of Hicklin v.
O'Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. Ct. App. 1956), which had upheld such an
agreement. The Dwyer court stated that Hicklin "completely ignored the
effect the covenant might have upon potential clients. The court there
viewed the matter as a business proposition and failed to respect the
underlying ethical considerations affecting the practice of law." Dwyer,
336 A.2d at 501.
170. The Dwyer court drew upon several sources in addition to the
Code to ascertain public policy with respect to the restrictive covenants
between attorneys. These sources included Drinker's treatise on Legal
Ethics; observations attributed to Abraham Lincoln; and earlier cases
expressing New Jersey policy.' See 336 A.2d at 499-500.
Interestingly, the section of Drinker's treatise which was cited in
Dwyer reflects the same perspective on the unique nature of a lawyer's
relationships with clients and the impossibility of transferring a lawyer's
goodwill as did an earlier opinion of the court which involved physicians.
See Mandeville v. Harman, 7 A. 37, 40-41 (N.J. Ch. 1886).
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that sound public policy requires application of a per se rule to
restrictive covenants between attorneys to uphold their duty to
public service and clients' rights to freely choose an attor-
ney.'7
The two courts that have sought to rationalize the applica-
tion of a per se rule to restrictive covenants between attorneys
and the rule of reason to restrictive covenants between physi-
cians have failed to provide a sufficient justification.
In Karlin v. Weinberg," Dr. Karlin hired Dr. Weinberg,
who had just completed his medical education, to assist him
with his dermatology practice. The parties' agreement specified
that Dr. Weinberg could not practice dermatology for a period
of five years within a 10-mile radius of Dr. Karlin's office after
terminating his employment.' After the parties terminated
their relationship, however, Dr. Weinberg established a derma-
tology practice several doors away from Dr. Karlin's office.'74
Dr. Karlin sought damages and injunctive relief.
Relying on Dwyer v. Jung, the New Jersey Chancery Court
declared that restrictive covenants between doctors, like re-
strictive covenants between lawyers, were contrary to public
policy and invalid as a matter of law.' 5 On appeal, however,
the New Jersey Appellate Division adopted the opposite view.
While endorsing the holding that restrictive covenants between
attorneys were contrary to public policy,' 6 the court distin-
171. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y.
1989); In re Silverberg, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1980); Gray v. Mar-
tin, 663 P.2d 1285 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). But cf Haight, Brown &
Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
172. 390 A.2d 1161 (N.J. 1978).
173. Id. at 1164.
174. Id. The parties disagreed about whether their oral partnership
agreement incorporated the restrictive covenant that had been a part of
their earlier employment contract.
175. Id. In the chancery court, Weinberg moved for partial summary
judgment dismissing Karlin's claim that he breached the restrictive cove-
nant. The motion was granted, with the court noting in an oral opinion
that restrictive covenants between physicians were per se unreasonable
and unenforceable. New Jersey's Appellate Division reversed the trial
court and ruled that such covenants were not per se invalid. Instead,
according to the appellate court, they were enforceable if the plaintiff had
a legitimate protectable interest to protect and the public was not
harmed. Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1164-65.
176. Id. at 1167.
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guished Dwyer from Karlin on its facts.'77 Specifically, the
court noted differences in the scope of the covenants at issue in
the two cases,'78 and that, while it was constitutionally obli-
gated to enforce the Code of Professional Responsibility's ban
on restrictive covenants between attorneys, it had no such duty
to enforce AMA guidelines. 7 ' Therefore, rather than adopt a
per se rule, the court opted for the rule of reason."
Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll.8' is the only other reported deci-
sion that acknowledges and seeks to reconcile the inconsisten-
cy of applying a per se rule to restrictive covenants between
attorneys and the rule of reason to covenants between physi-
cians. Yet, like Karlin, this opinion manages to avoid the un-
derlying theoretical issues.
Ohio Urology involved an employment contract between a
urological surgeon and an Ohio medical corporation that spe-
cialized in urology. The employee/physician's two-year employ-
ment contract included a restrictive covenant barring him from
177. Id.
178. The restrictive covenant in Dwyer barred the partners from ever
representing a client who had been designated as "belonging" to another
partner. The covenant in Karlin, however, only barred Dr. Weinberg from
continuing a relationship with former patients within a 10-mile radius of
Dr. Karlin's office for a period of five years. In this regard, the court
noted:
[wihile it is true that if the covenant is ultimately found en-
forceable some patients may have to travel a greater distance to
Dr. Weinberg's new office (and conceivably some a shorter dis-
tance) than they travelled to his former office, no patient will, by
force of law, automatically be deprived of continuing his ongoing
relationship with his physician. Consequently, Dwyer has no
applicability where a restrictive covenant among physicians au-
thorizes the maintenance of the relationship within certain geo-
graphical or time limitations.
Id.
179. At the time of the Karlin case, the AMA's 1977 version of the
rule against restrictive covenants was in effect. See supra notes 35-37
and accompanying text. In 1980, the AMA revised its guidelines and
declared that restrictive covenants between physicians were not in the
public interest. See supra notes 38-39.
180. Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1169. Interestingly, the majority expressed
concern that the restrictive covenant might prevent patients who wanted
to continue treatment with the departing physician from doing so. This
concern conflicts with the court's acceptance of the premise that restric-
tive covenants between physicians are a legitimate way for employ-
er/physicians to interfere with patients' range of choices by making it in-
convenient for them to follow the departing physician.
181. 594 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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practicing urology within a five-mile radius of any of the
corporation's offices for a period of two years.'82 When a fi-
nancial disagreement between the parties could not be re-
solved, the defendant terminated his employment and estab-
lished a urology practice one block from one of plaintiffs offic-
es. The corporation moved to enjoin the violation of the restric-
tive covenant.'83
The trial court held that the restrictive covenant was con-
trary to public policy and unenforceable, citing new AMA
guidelines which stated that restrictive covenants between
physicians were contrary to the public interest."' According
to the court, the state licensing statute, which empowered a
state medical board to discipline doctors for violating the
AMA's code of ethics, incorporated the AMA code into the
state's public policy.8 5
The appellate court did not analyze whether the theoretical
underpinnings of the per se rule applied to restrictive cove-
nants between physicians. Instead, it focused on linguistic
differences between the AMA guidelines on restrictive cove-
nants and comparable provisions in the ABA's Model Code.'86
In remanding the case, the court instructed the trial court to
apply the rule of reason.'87
Neither Karlin nor Ohio Urology thoughtfully considered
whether as a matter of public policy a physician/employer's
commercial risk of losing patients is more deserving of judicial
protection than the doctor-patient relationship or a patient's
ability to freely choose a physician.'88 Instead, by adopting
182. Id. at 1029.
183. Id. at 1030.
184. Id. The referee relied on the AMA's 1989 Current Opinions of
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1030-31. Specifically, the court noted that the AMA rules
merely "discourage" physicians from entering into restrictive covenants,
while the Code of Professional Responsibility unequivocally bars attorneys
from participating in noncompetition agreements. Id.
187. Id. at 1032.
188. In. the course of considering the enforceability of restrictive cove-
nants between doctors, some courts have expressed disdain at the specta-
cle of physicians battling over the right to profit from treating the ill.
See, e.g., Novendstern v. Mt. Kisco Medical Group, No. 2537/91, slip op.
at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1991) ("Graced with the ability to practice
medicine and honored with the privilege of licensure, these physicians
now do battle over turf and money."); Dickinson Medical Group v. Foote,
1984 WL 8208, at *2 ("[A physician] is claiming, in essence, that [he]
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the rule of reason, which derives primarily from commercial
case law, both courts have elevated physicians' self-interest
over the needs and interests of patients and the public. Yet, it
is the professionals' duty to suppress self-interest that enables
the formation and maintenance of fiduciary relationships with
patient/clients, who typically lack the education and expertise
needed to critique professional advice." 9 The ability to trust
professional advice and decision making turns upon whether
patient/clients can assume that the "practitioner's self-interest
is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's interest
and the public good.""°  Without this expectation, cli-
ent/patients could never be sure if a lawyer was proposing
litigation to increase attorneys' fees or whether a doctor was
recommending surgery because it yielded the highest prof-
its. 9'
By focusing on tangential and inconsequential factual dis-
tinctions, both Karlin and Ohio Urology lost sight of the funda-
mental similarity between the destructive impact of restrictive
covenants on relationships between lawyers and their clients
and doctors and their patients, and the inappropriateness of
applying commercial standards in both professional con-
texts. ' 2 This myopic approach' was the focus of an acrimo-
has earned the right to make a pr6fit from those unfortunate persons
suffering from various forms of cancer . . . . Somehow this lacks the ring
of humanitarianism that once was associated with the practice of medi-
cine.").
189. See In re Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974); ROSCOE
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5-6 (1983).
190. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10
(1986).
191. This view is repeatedly asserted by prominent members of the
medical profession in an effort to counteract the increasing commercial-
ization of American medicine. For instance, in 1985 the AMA reminded
its members that medicine is a profession, not a business, and that phy-
sicians are obligated to place their patients' needs above their economic
interests. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Report of the Board of
Trustees, Commercialism in the Practice of Medicine, June 1983. See also
Arnold S. Reiman, Dealing With Conflicts of Interests, 313 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 749, 750 (1985) ("Physicians are ethically bound to place the medi-
cal care needs of their patients before their own financial interests-an
obligation that clearly sets the practice of medicine apart from business.")
192. Several commentators have noted the inconsistency of applying a
per se ban on noncompetition agreements between attorneys, while not
applying such a rule to physicians and other professionals whose practice
depends upon the maintenance of confidential, fiduciary relationships.
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nious dissent in Karlin by Justice Sullivan:
The art of healing the sick and the infirm is effected with a
public interest. The restrictive covenant, which the Court is
upholding in principle, does violence to the concept of the
physician-patient relationship. A person requiring medical
treatment and advice goes to the doctor of his or her
choice .... The relationship is so personal and so sensitive,
and the right of a patient to consult the physician of one's
own choice so fundamental, that a restrictive covenant which
substantially intrudes on that relationship and interferes
with that fundamental right should be held contrary to public
policy. This policy does not exist for the benefit of the physi-
cian consulted but rather to protect the patient's right to seek
medical treatment from the doctor whom the patient believes
is best able to treat him."
See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law
and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988) (ques-
tioning why attorneys are the only professionals prohibited from entering
into restrictive covenants); Richard P. Bergen, Practical Considerations on
Restrictive Covenants, 203 JAMA 197, 198 (Jan. 1, 1968) (arguing that
doctor-patient relationships are more enduring than lawyer-client relation-
ships).
193. The New Jersey Supreme Court's recent opinion in Jacob v.
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992), which reaffirms
that covenants not to compete between attorneys violate public policy,
hints that its myopia with respect to similar provisions between physi-
cians has yet to be cured. During an eloquent, detailed discussion of the
dangers that noncompetition agreements pose to the "lawyer-client rela-
tionship and, more importantly, with clients' free choice of counsel," id.
at 148, the court makes a reference to some unstated distinction between
restrictive covenants between attorneys and those between physicians.
The Jacob court stated that by "distinguishing an employment agreement
among physicians from one among attorneys, this Court, in' Karlin v.
Weinberg endorsed the principles enunciated in Dwyer." Id. at 147 (cita-
tions omitted). This remark suggests that a majority of the New Jersey
Supreme Court remains unconcerned by the dangers posed by
noncompetition agreements between physicians to the doctor-patient rela-
tionship and patients' free choice of a physician. Indeed, noncompetition
agreements between physicians arguably threaten harm to a range of
patient needs and interests that are more serious than clients' needs and
interests, which are primarily financial.
194. Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1170-71 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Justice
Sullivan was joined in dissent by Justices Pashman and Conford.
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2. Inconsistency With Legal Doctrine Protecting Doctor-
Patient Relationships
The majority approach to restrictive covenants between
physicians places the relationship between physicians and
patients on the same legal footing as the relationship between
commercial sellers and customers. Yet, in other areas of the
law, this relationship enjoys a unique status.
A majority of states have statutes that recognize a doctor-
patient testimonial privilege. 5 Under the privilege, physi-
cians cannot be compelled to testify about information con-
veyed to them in confidence by patients.'9 The doctor-patient
privilege reflects the social valuation that preserving the integ-
rity of the special relationship between a doctor and patient
outweighs the value such evidence may have in a legal pro-
ceeding.'97 The special status of the physician-patient rela-
tionship within the law of evidence is difficult to square with
the majority approach to restrictive covenants between physi-
195. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1992); CAL. EVID. CODE §
992 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(d) (West 1989);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-14-5(4) (West 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734(B) (West 1991); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2157
(Callaghan 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(lXd) (West 1988); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.0605 (Vernon 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.225
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.26 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4504(a) (McKinney
1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(1) (Anderson 1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503(B) (West 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5929 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-7 (1987); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08(a) (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1612 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(4) (West
1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.04(2) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
196. While a majority of states recognize some version of a doctor-pa-
tient testimonial privilege, it is often subject to a number of exceptions.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions the exceptions seem to overtake the privi-
lege. For example, California's doctor-patient privilege statute lists 12
exceptions, including any civil action in which the patient's condition is
at issue, any criminal proceeding, any medical malpractice case, and any
will contest. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 996-1007 (West 1966 & Supp.
1992).
197. For a detailed discussion of the history and purpose of the doc-
tor-patient privilege, see Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physi-
cian-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661, 667-85
(1985).
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cians, which values protecting this bond less than preventing a
decrease in physician/employers' incomes.
Tort law also recognizes the uniquely sensitive nature of the
physician-patient relationship. Under the common law doctrine
of patient abandonment, physicians who unilaterally terminate
existing relationships with patients are liable for damages. 98
Underlying the doctrine of patient abandonment is the recogni-
tion that patients can be injured merely from the involuntary
termination of the physician-patient relationship."' Physi-
cians may also be sanctioned under disciplinary rules for aban-
doning a patient."° The clear public policy objective of the
tort of patient abandonment is to deter discontinuity in the
doctor-patient relationship and to minimize the traumatic
effects of terminating this relationship when it is necessary.
Finally, a number of states recognize the continuous treat-
ment doctrine, under which the statute of limitations for filing
a medical malpractice action is tolled while a patient is under
a doctor's continuing care.'O This doctrine promotes continu-
198. See McGulpin v. Bessmer, 43 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Iowa 1950) (re-
versing lower court decision for failing to instruct jury on theory of pa-
tient abandonment); Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963)
(recognizing that patient abandonment is a distinct theory of liability);
Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 34 N.E.2d 367, 370 (N.Y. 1941) (up-
.holding lower court award for patient abandonment); Lee v. Dewbre, 362
S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (recognizing patient's cause of
action for abandonment). Cf Payton v. Weaver, 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct.
App. 1982); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937). See also Leon L.
McIntire, Note, The Action of Abandonment in Medical Malpractice Liti-
gation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 834 (1962); C.T. Dreschler, Annotation, Liability
of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1957).
199. See 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 9 8.07(1) (1989).
200. See, e.g., Burdge v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 403 S.E.2d
114, 116-17 (S.C. 1991) ("Burdge failed to inform his patients that he
would not be able to deliver their babies. The failure to inform patients
such as Ms. Couch deprived. the patients of their right to choose their'
doctor.")
201. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Ark. 1990);
Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 215 A.2d 825, 828 (Md. 1966); Hotelling v.
Walther, 130 P.2d 944, 946 (Or. 1942); Farley v. Goode, 252 S.E.2d 594,
594 (Va. 1979); Samuelson v. Freeman, 454 P.2d 406, 410 (Wash. 1969)
(en banc); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 1985); Vinklaret v.
Cane, 691 S.W.2d 108, 109-10: (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). See dlsb 1 LOUISELL
& WILLIAMS, supra note 199, 13.09. Under a number of state statutes
of limitation, the continuous treatment doctrine is a recognized exception.
See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 214-a (McKinney 1990); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.5838 (Callaghan 1986 & Supp. 1992).
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ity in the doctor-patient relationship by not requiring that
patients summarily terminate this relationship and institute a
malpractice action when they first doubt the adequacy of a
physician's treatment.2"
3. Inconsistency with Increasing Recognition of Patient's
Right of Self-Determination
The majority approach to restrictive covenants between
physicians, which recognizes that patients "belong" to physi-
cian/employers, is contrary to the current trend in the law of
expanding patients' autonomy and rights of self-determination.
These developments, which have revolutionized the practice of
medicine over the past twenty-five years, have transformed the
patient from a passive object of physicians' determinations into
the ultimate decision makers about the health care they re-
ceive."'
This trend is reflected in a variety of judicial decisions and
legislative enactments. For instance, under the doctrine of
informed consent, patients must be informed of the material
risks associated with alternative treatments so that they are
able to make rational decisions about their health care.04 A
202. See, e.g., Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 659-60 (Del. 1987) (argu-
ing that the assumption underlying the continuous treatment doctrine is
that medical care is best when the physician-patient relationship en-
dures). This concept has also been applied in malpractice cases against
attorneys, presumably to promote continuity in the attorney-client rela-
tionship. See Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (N.D. 1986);
Goodwin v. Schulte, 320 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Seigel v.
Kranis, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (App. Div. 1968); Brown v. Johnstone, 450
N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
203. For excellent analyses of the impact of this legal trend upon the
practice of medicine in the United States, see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 104-65 (1984), and DAVID J. ROTHMAN,
STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS
TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 222-46 (1991).
204. The leading cases discussing the doctrine of informed consent are
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) andCanterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). For discussions of recent developments in the application of
this doctrine, see Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); Theodore R.
LeBlang, Informed Consent-Duty and Causation: A Survey of Current
Developments, 18 FORUM 280 (1983); Frank M. McClellan, Informed Con-
sent to Medical Therapy and Experimentation, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 81
(1982); Patrick D. Haliigan, The Standard of Disclosure by Physicians to
Patients: Competing Models of Informed Consent, 41 LA. L. REV. 9 (1980).
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physician's failure to fulfill this duty gives rise to a cause of
action for negligence."5
Increasing judicial recognition of a patient's right of self-
determination is also evident in "right to die" cases. The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has presumed that competent pa-
tients have a constitutionally protected liberty interest to re-
fuse life-sustaining medical treatment2 and has recognized
that incompetent patients also possess this interest.0 7 In ad-
dition, a number of state courts have ruled that competent and
incompetent patients have a state based privacy right to have
life-sustaining treatment withdrawn."°
Recent federal and state legislative enactments similarly
strengthen patients' automony and authority within the struc-
ture of the medical decision making. For example, the Medic-
aid Self-Determination Act, which applies to health care insti-
tutions that receive federal Medicaid and Medicare funding,
requires that patients be informed of their rights under state
law to accept or refuse medical treatment.0 9 A number of
states have also enacted statutes that protect patients'
rights.210 Additionally, a majority of states now recognize the
205. See 2 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 199, 9 22.04 at 22-14
(1987). A physician may be liable for battery if a patient fails to entirely
consent to treatment. Id. at 22-12.
206. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990).
207. Id. at 280. While acknowledging that patients have a liberty
interest in refusing life sustaining medical treatment, the Court also
recognized that states have a competing interest in preserving life, which
justifies the imposition of evidentiary standards that must be satisfied
before treatment is terminated. Id. at 281-83.
208. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Ct. App.
1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Ct. App.
1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re
Steverns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d
738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983).
209. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West 1992).
210. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.825 (1990) (giving patients right
to be informed about treatment and to participate in medical decision
making); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-103-121 (1991) (guaranteeing rights of
elderly and indigent patients at long-term care facilities); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:13-5 (West 1981) (giving nursing home.patients the right to control
various aspects of their lives and treatment); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2803-C (McKinney 1985) (giving patients right to access information re-
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validity of living wills, which articulate a patient's wishes with
respect to the continuation of life-sustaining treatment, and
durable powers of attorney, which appoint a third party to
make medical decisions if the signatory becomes unable to
express her wishes.2 '
In the face of these developments, which have significantly
enlarged patients' rights and ability to self-determine health
care, the majority approach to restrictive covenants between
physicians anachronistically persists in viewing patients as
passive objects whose right to choose a physician without inter-
ference is less deserving of legal protection than the preserva-
tion of physician/employers' right to contract and their finan-
cial interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
At best, noncompetition agreements- between physicians
inconvenience patients and interfere with their access to
health care by the physician of their choice in a conveniently
located hospital. At worst, these agreements may completely
supplant a patient's choice to maintain a relationship with a
departing physician if, for example, the patient is hospitalized,
is too sick to travel to a new office in a distant location, or
because the quality of care offered by hospitals outside of the
covenant area is unacceptable.
Medical research demonstrates that continuity in the physi-
cian-patient relationship yields medical and financial benefits
and that the involuntary termination of this relationship can
be harmful to patients and costly to society as a whole. In
recognition of this, the doctor-patient relationship has long
enjoyed a special status within disparate bodies of law. Judi-
cial treatment of restrictive covenants should similarly protect
this relationship by holding that- such provisions are contrary
to public policy and unenforceable. Such an approach will pro-
mote the public service function of the medical profession and
foster patients' right to choose the physician they prefer and
trust.
garding their condition and proposed treatment).
211. See Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade,
1987 Wis. L. REV. 737 (1987); David A. Peters, Advance Medical Direc.
tives: The Case for the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 8 J.
LEG. MED. 437, 437-39 (1987); Susan R. Martyn & Lynn Jacobs, Legislat-
ing Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Dura-
ble Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779, 786-87,(1984).
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